We analyse the accomplishment rates of anti money laundering recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in the five Andean countries between 1989 and 1999. We find an uneven application of FATF recommendations across these countries, mainly due to differences in the regulation of the financial and banking systems and in the degree of interregional and international cooperation. We also identify the main money laundering channels adopted in each country and find a correspondence between the lack of specific domestic legislation and the development of specific local money laundering techniques. Finally, with an econometric test on money demand, we observe that a stricter FATF compliance relative to neighbouring countries has significant negative effects on excess domestic cash balances, net of the positive effect generated by the higher compliance per se. Our policy advice is therefore that a coordinated anti money laundering action is urgently needed in order to avoid such externalities.
Introduction
Money laundering 2 may generate serious costs for the hosting countries (increased political corruption, criminal infiltration and crowding out of sound firms in the banking and in the industrial sector) as well as negative externalities for the whole financial system (Quirk, 1996; Tanzi, 1996) .
For this reason, growing attention is being paid to the role that the size of the illegal economy and money laundering may play in the observed asset volatility and in the recent surge in financial market instability (Camdessus, 1998) . 3 Conventional wisdom assumes that, since money laundering may create short term benefits in terms of higher capital inflows, insufficient international cooperation against money laundering creates a typical free riding problem. A country which adopts a more relaxed attitude may attract an inflow of regional illegal wealth to be laundered, thereby generating severe negative externalities for their
neighbours. An effective coordination of regulation and enforcement from neighbouring countries is therefore fundamental to tackle this problem. This paper tests the relevance of this hypothesis. It compares the accomplishment of money laundering international recommendations in the Andean countries and relates it to the existing typology of money laundering techniques and to the dynamics of cash money balances in these countries.
The paper is divided into four sections. 2 The 91/308 EEC Directive defines Money Laundering as: 1) the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such activity to evade the legal consequences of his action; 2) the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity; 3) the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property was derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity; 4) participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions mentioned in the previous paragraphs. 3 It is believed in fact that the presence of money launderers in financial markets generates inefficient trades for reasons which are different from those of noise or liquidity traders (Grossman-Stiglitz, 1980; De Long et al.,1990 ). In the money launderer's case, the investment in assets which are below the efficient frontier becomes individually profitable if we consider the reduction of risk of seizure and prosecution generated by the money laundering activity.
The first section describes the methodology adopted by the EEC-commissioned research The third section analyses responses to a qualitative questionnaire submitted to domestic financial and regulatory authorities. The questionnaire aimed to identify the main money laundering channels adopted in each country and to verify if a correspondence exists between insufficient compliance to FATF legislation and the taxonomy of local money laundering techniques.
The fourth and final section tries to measure with an econometric test the impact of the uneven FATF compliance in the Andean countries on their excess money balances. Our methodology identifies and tests two different sources of effects: the degree of compliance to FATF regulation per se and the individual country deviation from average regional compliance as a measure of the externality effect generated by the lack of international cooperation against money laundering.
Structure and methodology of the research
The EEC-commissioned international research team was composed of a Central Research
Unit and five Local Research Units, one for each country. The LRUs carried out field work by contacting local authorities and institutions in order to collect legal and economic information in areas and sectors involved in the fight against money laundering.
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The CRU asked each LRU to elaborate a detailed report on the domestic legislation against money laundering. These reports were revised by the CRU which wrote a final document on the basis of the information contained in each country report. In a second step of the research, the LRUs were asked to submit a questionnaire to local financial and regulatory authorities for a qualitative estimation of the most important money laundering techniques adopted in each country.
In its final report the CRU developed, jointly with the LRUs, a comparative analysis of the Andean countries anti money laundering legislation with respect to the exogenous benchmark represented by the 40 recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The comparison consisted of attributing a score to the relative accomplishment for each of the recommendations according to the greater/lesser degree of closeness of domestic legislation to the FATF guidelines.
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The choice of the FATF guidelines as a benchmark is justified by the characteristics of this organization. The Financial Action Task Force is an international institution which was created in 1989 by 26 member states (belonging to the G-7 countries, to OCSE and to the European Union). It has neither a statute nor a constitution and it rather operates as an informal group based on consensus. Because of this, the 40 FATF guidelines are not compulsory legal norms, although the G-7 mandated constitution of the group attaches high relevance to them. These guidelines also have 4 The composition of CRU and LRUs and the list of cooperating institutions is presented in an Appendix available upon request. 5 This choice was implicitly based on the assumption that a rational money launderer is expected to evaluate anti money laundering legislation when selecting a country to place his illegal proceeds. Since the decision-making process of money launderers hinges on the existence of legal loopholes in the legislation of different countries, the CRU decided that the identification of gray zones in each legislation was of paramount importance and had to be the main focus of the research.
"prudential, general and comprehensive" character and are meant to be accepted by both member and non-member countries.
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In order to give some quantitative relevance to the LRUs' assessment, the CRU defined a scale of compliance with FATF recommendations which is illustrated in the table below (Table 1) .
The score covers different degrees of anti money laundering legislative effort ranging from the absence of the norm incorporating the FATF recommendation into domestic legislation to the existence of an explicit regulation for its application. Its limit, though, is the impossibility of verifying the effective enforcement of the law and of the related regulation.
Tab. 1 Scores for the evaluation of the Andean countries accomplishment rates with the 40 FATF regulations

Category Characteristics
I : insufficient (Score 0)
The norm incorporating the FATF recommendation into domestic legislation does not exist. There is no bill of law that contemplates its creation.
L : low (Score 1)
There is a bill of law that contemplates the creation of the norm. This should reveal the willingness to enact the norm.
M : middle (Score 2)
The norm exists but has to be regulated in order to be effectively applied.
H : high (Score 3)
The norm exists and is adequately regulated in the domestic legal system.
Comparative results on the accomplishments of FATF regulation in the Andean countries
The detail of country scores assigned in the year of the inquiry (1999) for any of the 40
Recommendations is presented in Table 2 . The synthesis of the relative compliance in each of the four subsections in which the 40 recommendations are divided (general framework, legal system, 6 As a further confirm of the relevance of this institution it must be considered that observing the recommendations and joining the FATF constitutes a kind of international certification for the country following such a course of action. FATF compliance is in fact regarded as conferring greater international credibility and reducing country risk under the specific feature of the danger of criminal infiltration in the economic and financial system (FATF Report, 1999). financial system, international cooperation) is presented in Table 3 , while the years in which principles of each recommendation were incorporated into domestic legislation are shown in Table   4 . The full description of the contents of any Recommendation and the justification for the score assigned by the CRU are provided in an Appendix of the paper and are available upon request.
As a general comment to the collected evidence we observe that, even though no country reached the highest possible score (120), all countries are getting closer to the FATF guidelines in the considered period ( Table 3 The analysis by subgroups shows that the difference between Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, on the one side, and Colombia and Venezuela, on the other side, is mainly due to the different role of the domestic financial systems' legislation against money laundering.
The synthetic perspective shown in tab. 3 confirms that Bolivia and Peru are distant more than 20 percent (and Ecuador more than 40 percent) from the top score when the role of financial systems is considered, while Peru and Venezuela are ranked lowest in terms of international cooperation (more than 33 percent).
Several findings justify the low score of Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia in the financial system legislation during our sample period (Table 2) . Peru, did not extend the scope of anti money laundering recommendations to non-bank financial institutions and to businesses and professions which are not financial institutions but conduct financial activities (recommendation 8). Bolivian legislation does not prohibit anonymous accounts, accounts on fictitious names and secret accounts ; ii) Venezuela does not participate to agreements for mutual assistance in the production of records by financial institutions (recommendation 37) and iii) money laundering is not a cause of extradition in this country (recommendation 40). In the same way, Peru has not ratified treaties to exchange information on suspicious transactions with their neighbours (recommendation 32) and has no regulation on the allocation of confiscated assets related to money laundering for individuals subject to prosecution in more than one country (recommendation 39).
Descriptive evidence on the relationship between FATF compliance and the taxonomy of money laundering techniques in the Andean countries
The identification of the most important and frequent techniques that are used to "recycle" illegal proceeds is a fundamental step for an effective action against money laundering. For this reason local financial and regulatory authorities were asked by the LRUs to identify the most widely followed techniques.
The identified techniques are presented here according to a taxonomy which divides them into different subsystems (financial sector, monetary and derivatives sector, non financial sector ) Our attempt in this section is to relate the techniques used in each sub-system to the loopholes of domestic legislations in order to identify the regulatory changes needed to fight money laundering.
In interpreting the results given by the LRUs' inquiry on the relative choice of different money laundering techniques in each country, we must consider that the main goal of any money laundering operation is that of hiding the illegal origin of the money used in the transaction together with the identity of the transactor.
Since the value of money depends on the possibility of its fruition, the value of illegal wealth is greatly reduced by the risk of confiscation and of prosecution of the owner. Therefore, in choosing the laundering channel, the owner of the illegal wealth considers both the gain from partially or completely eliminating the risk of seizure and prosecution and the expected gain from the asset in which he invests.
Given the relevant weight of the first element in this choice, channels in which the anonymity of transaction is higher, and anti money laundering legislation weaker, are generally preferred. In this perspective, consider that the use of the stock market, the banking system and the real estate sector as laundering channels does not easily allow to conceal the identity of the customer. 7 On the contrary, in other markets (black market of foreign currency, precious stones and gold), concealment of the illicit nature of funds is eased as the identity of the transactor may not be publicly revealed. In these cases, it would be advisable for anti money laundering legislation to find a mechanism to uncover the origins of such proceeds.
Tables 5 and 6 sum up the information collected by the CRUs on the most frequently used money laundering techniques in the Andean Countries.
In particular, table 6 analyses the economic sub-systems affected by the different types of recycling operations. The LRUs provided the information contained in this table by identifying the techniques most frequently used in their countries and by producing additional information on cases discovered and studied.
In such a case, the objective of any launderer is to sponge out any traces of the placement phase. This is possible through a series of complex transactions and by the use of of shell companies in order to eliminate any link with the origin of funds. 8 Two caveats need to be taken into account when interpreting the information contained in Tables 5 and 6 . First, the identification of money laundering techniques used in a country is the result of the LRU's analysis, on the basis of the indirect evidence on the phenomenon (i.e., excess inflow of capital relative to the expected asset profitability). Second, it is worth mentioning that the techniques listed in the tables have been classified as frequently used, by the LRU's and the CRU, on the basis of the results obtained by police investigations and case studies. Table 6 is that countries with weaker regulations against money laundering in the financial system (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador) have the widest range of money laundering techniques activated just in the financial system. In addition, the country with the weakest regulation in the financial system (Peru) has the highest ratio of financial to non financial money laundering techniques and, therefore presumably, a strong relative specialisation in financial sector money laundering with respect to the other Andean countries .
An interesting finding from
The direct effect and the externality effect of FATF accomplishment. A test on excess money balances
The 1999 FATF report on Bolivian economy emphasised the relevance of money laundering in this country by indicating that the average domestic bank deposit per person was above 200 thousand dollars. This figure was definitely not in line with the expected average money balancedomestic per capita income relationship both in developed and developing countries.
This simple descriptive example helps to understand why the few empirical papers trying to measure the size of the illegal economy and of money laundering consider the residual of money demand as one of the most reliable indicators. By microfounding the demand for currency in the recorded and in the illegal sector Bhattacharya (1990) provides a tentative estimation of the size of the latter relating it to the residual of the estimated demand for money. His reasoning is that the residual in the traditional money demand specification should proxy for the income from the illegal sector, since the only variable positively affecting the demand for currency in the illegal sector (illegal income) is not observed.
This approach has been criticised by Thomas (1999) who argues that this hypothesis for the explanation of the residual is observationally equivalent to a more general problem of misspecification of the money demand equation. Therefore, any attempt to infer the size of the illegal economy from the money demand residual would be biased by the likely omission of whatever relevant variable (or misspecification of the functional form).
In the approach we follow here we want to show that, even accepting the Thomas (1999) critique on the unmeasurability of illegal income, we can evaluate the impact of the observed compliance with FATF recommendations on money laundering under assumptions on the dynamics of illegal income which are not too restrictive.
Consider in fact the following demand for currency:
where M Rt are real domestic money balances, φ∈ [0, 40] measures compliance with FATF regulation proxied by the strength of anti money laundering legislation (40 is maximum compliance) , φ is the average compliance in the Andean countries (with the exception of the observed country), S is the soundness of the domestic financial system, Y DLt and Y RIt are, respectively, domestic legal and regional illegal income and R is the domestic interest rate. Our assumption is that stricter anti money laundering rules have a per se effect and -when compared to those of the neighbouring countries -an externality effect. This is because tougher regulation increases, on the one side, the reputation of the domestic banking system (S) and therefore its capacity of attracting legal domestic money balances, while, on the other side, it may have a negative effect on the capacity of attracting illegal income when rules of the neighbouring countries are more relaxed.
Taking logarithms we get:
The problem in (2) is that φ and φ are observable but S and y RIt are not. We therefore may estimate only:
The omitted variable bias should affect the significance of our estimated coefficients if their variables are correlated with those omitted. Furthermore, it should generate an upward bias on coefficient standard errors proportional to the variance of the omitted variables.
We take into account these biases when interpreting the results on the effect of FATF accomplishment to FATF recommendations. With regard to the first, a significant and positive β 3 would imply that compliance with anti money laundering rules is associated to an increase in money balances, unless the soundness of the banking system is positively related to FATF compliance but for reasons which are unrelated to the anti money laundering effort.
In the same time, a significant and negative β 4 should measure the negative externality effect of a relatively more severe anti money laundering effort, unless we suppose that the dynamics of regional illegal wealth is inversely related to the dynamics of the (φ -φ ) variable. Even though we cannot observe the dynamics of illegal regional wealth it is clear that this last hypothesis cannot hold since, by definition, regional illegal wealth cannot be related to each of the individual country deviations from the regional mean (i.e. if it is correlated with one country which is above the mean it cannot be correlated in the same direction with another country which is below the mean).
With regard to the second point, the overestimation of standard errors due to the omission of additional sources of variability strengthens the confidence in coefficients which are found significantly different from zero in our estimates.
In specifying the demand for currency in a small open economy we must also consider that money demand is not determined by home variables alone. In fact, some economists add foreign interest rates and exchange rate depreciation to equation (1). This extended specification helps to reduce the error in measuring the opportunity cost of holding money balances in a small open economy of a developing country, where the two additional variables may capture currency substitution and capital mobility effects.
On such a basis, and to reduce the possibility that our model is misspecified, we estimate this alternative specification which follows Khalid (1999) All variables are the same as those described in (1) with the exception of RF which is the foreign interest rate and ED which is the expected depreciation of domestic currency.
By taking logs, and considering the unobservable variable problem, we rewrite (3) as: 
Data source and estimation methods
Given the limited time span of our sample (11 years) we estimate the model with both yearly and quarterly data taken from the Datastream database which collects macroeconomic information from international and domestic sources. For each Andean country we build series of real GDP, average time deposit interest rate, real money and quasi money 9 in US dollars. Since some Andean countries do not have quarterly data for the GDP we linearly interpolate yearly data.
9 Money equals the sum of currency outside deposit money banks and demand deposits other than those of the central government. Quasi money adds time savings and foreign currency deposits of resident sectors other than the central government to the previous monetary aggregate.
Stationarity tests carried on quarterly data clearly show that our variables are I(1) ( Results on the impact of FATF compliance on excess money balances using yearly data are resumed in Table 9 , while full details of each estimate are available from the authors upon request.
These results clearly show that the two effects (the positive effect of FATF compliance per se and the negative effect when compliance is higher than neighbours' average) are significant and robust across different estimated models (fixed effects, random effects, pooled data), different specifications (Khalid, 1999 and Bhattacharya, 1990 ) and different dependent variables (money and quasi money).
Moreover, the specification with the dummy variable measuring FATF compliance hardly passes the Hausman test. This demonstrates that our model with the direct and externality effects provides a richer interpretation of the available evidence. Furthermore, in the specification which tests the effects of drastic changes in domestic regulation, the FATF compliance dummy is always negative and significant suggesting that, at the moment of the stronger anti money laundering effort, the externality effect prevails over the effect of the increased attraction of legal capital from a sounder financial system. In fact, the date of the most drastic increase in FATF compliance for one country does not coincide with that of all their neighbours (only the years of Colombia and Venezuela coincide) and this lack of coordination generates drastic changes in the externality variable.
As expected, the effect of FATF compliance is stronger and more significant when measured on quasi money, an aggregate which includes also foreign currency domestic deposits, usually In order to have country specific estimates which do not need to assume equality of parameters across different countries we repeat our estimates on quarterly data for each individual country. The cost of adding degrees of freedom to our estimate, though, is quite high. First, we do not have quarterly GDP data and therefore we need to interpolate them. Second, unavoidable measurement inaccuracies in the anti money laundering compliance variables are enhanced when we stretch them to produce higher frequency observations.
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Country specific estimates carried on with the above mentioned limitations show that our model fits well for Ecuador, Bolivia and Colombia, does not give significant results for Peru and is not consistent with Venezuelan data.
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10 This is because we know the year but not the quarter in which a given recommendation has been incorporated into domestic legislation. 11 To verify the robustness of our findings we re-estimated the different models with the inclusion of variables measuring structural changes occurred in some of the Andean countries in the considered period (such as the introduction and removal in Peru and Venezuela of the prohibition to open current accounts abroad). We also tested the models with alternative FATF variables based on: i) on using recommendations on the financial system only (1 to 30), ii) on weighting our indexes with the enforcement capacity of the legal system -the definition of the variable is Legal institutions, including access to discriminatory non judiciary that are supportive of rule of law principles and the source of this information for 1980-1997 is PRS Group, International Country Risk Guide (various issues).
Conclusions and policy suggestions
There is widespread consensus among academicians and policymakers on the increasingly important effects that illegal economy and illegal capital movements have on the observed macroeconomic and financial variables. This consensus is matched by a discomforting declaration of impotence due to the admission of the incapacity of monitoring and statistically evaluating such effects.
The present paper tries to perform this task by developing a field research which measures the compliance with anti money laundering FATF recommendations of domestic legal systems and the relationship between it and the most important money laundering channels in the five Andean countries. Even though we are aware that our attempt is subject to several limits (some arbitrariness in the calculation of the compliance indicators, poor quality of some indicators) which we try to overcome with our sensitivity analysis, we nonetheless believe that it indicates a valuable path which can be followed by future investigation.
The research finds an uneven accomplishment of FATF regulation across countries and (at a descriptive level) a relationship between loopholes of domestic legal systems and the types of money laundering techniques adopted in a given country.
The econometric analysis relates legislation efforts to the dynamics of cash money balances and does not reject the hypothesis that an increase in anti money laundering effort has a positive effect per se (attributed by us to the increased soundness of the banking system) and a negative effect if it is not accompanied by a similar move from neighbouring countries (negative externality effect). Furthermore, when the test is performed just on a dummy variable which accounts for the more drastic change in FATF compliance in each country, the effect on money balances is negative and significant. Since these drastic changes are nonsynchronous and therefore generate severe externality effects, they appear consistent with the hypothesis that the externality effect prevails on the per se effect in these cases.
Our results lead us to formulate some policy proposals. More specifically we suggest: i) to implement a common course of action to harmonize and level up the Andean regulations in order to make them closer to the FATF recommendations; ii) to create an institutional network to guarantee an adequate perception of recycling phenomena and the constant evolution of laundering strategies and techniques; iii) to update the FATF recommendations to support local efforts in the creation of new investigative techniques that counter modern laundering techniques; iv) to implement a common enforcement system to guarantee observance of FATF recommendations.
We think that these proposals may contribute to implement the cooperative effort needed to reduce the negative externality effect of isolated anti money laundering effort documented by our paper, an effect which may be one of the main obstacles in the improvement of the international effort against this type of crime. There is no bill of law that contemplates its creation; L : low There is a bill of law that contemplates the creation of the norm. This should reveal the willingness to enact the norm. M : middle The norm exists but has to be regulated in order to be effectively applied H : high The norm exists and is adequately regulated in the domestic legal system.
The full text of each recommendation is presented in an Appendix available from the authors upon request.
Tab. The full text of each recommendation is presented in an Appendix available from the authors upon request. incorporated in the domestic legislation, to 0, if none of them has been incorporated) and φ is the average accomplishment rate for the Andean countries (excluding the country under observation), r t is the log of the time deposit interest rate on domestic currency of the Andean countries taken from IMF statistics, rf t is the log of the weighted average of G-7 deposit rates (IMF statistics). The weights are given by the G7 domestic nominal GDPs in US dollars, ed t is the log of domestic currency-US dollar exchange rate. DFATF is a dummy which takes the value of one from the year in which we observe a drastic change in compliance with FATF recommendations (1996 for Bolivia which passes from 8 to 38 recommendations, 1991 for Colombia which passes from 1 to 19 recommendations, 1993 for Ecuador which passes from 18 to 31 recommendations, 1990 for Peru which passes from 4 to 13 recommendations, 1993 for Venezuela which passes from 5 to 22 recommendations) and zero before that date. 
